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Abstract 
Basic public pension schemes and cut backs in earnings-related public pensions led to an 
increasing role of supplementary pensions such as pension funds for old-age incomes. In 
addition  to  demographic  changes  that  challenge  public  pensions,  private  pensions  face 
financial  market  risks. To  what  extent  are  the  scope  of  pension  fund  capitalism  and  the 
impact of financial crises on pension funds related to different institutional arrangements?  
Given  that  different  production  regimes  reflect  different  pension  systems,  we  expect 
systematic diversities with regard to the public-private pension mix and the specific design of 
supplementary  pensions.  These  varieties  should  be  mirrored  in  different  forms  of 
vulnerability of pension funds to financial market crises. We hypothesize a higher scope of 
pension  fund  capitalism  and  vulnerability  to  financial  market  crises  in  countries  with 
predominant market-based coordination mechanisms and short term strategies on financial 
markets (i.e. Liberal Market Economies). 
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I.   Introduction
1 
In the past few decades we have seen a shift from public pension systems toward private 
pension systems,  particularly  in the form of funded  occupational  pensions.  In  addition  to 
insurance  contracts,  pension  funds  are  the  big  winners  of  this  development.  This  cross-
country trend goes hand in hand with country specific peculiarities. The scope and form of 
pension  funds  differ  in  terms  of  lower  and  higher  importance  for  the  old-age  income, 
contingent  upon  the  level  of  public  pensions  (Bismarck  versus  Beveridge  system).  In 
addition,  pension  funds  consider  the  interests  of  their  beneficiaries  in  different  ways, 
depending on the governance form (employer‘s commitment or collective agreement) as well 
as the organization and participating actors (market, firms, social partners, state). Given that 
different production regimes reflect different pension systems – in line with the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (VoC) – we expect systematic diversities regarding the public-private 
pension mix and the specific design of supplementary pensions. These varieties should be 
mirrored in different forms of vulnerability to financial market crises. This article contributes to 
the  scientific  evaluation  of  the  current  financial  crisis  and  adapts  the  VoC  approach  to 
multipillar-pension  systems.  In  practice,  this  article  aims  to  show  mechanisms  and 
regulations that help to reduce pension funds‘ vulnerability to financial crises. 
Financial markets and state economies worldwide are still facing the heaviest financial crises 
since the Second World War. Not only states and banks, but almost all investment players, 
including pension funds, have to deal with stock market turmoil and losses. Although the 
economic and financial problems in each country are similar, the impact of the turbulences 
has  varied.  We  have  already  gained  descriptive  knowledge  about  the  impact  of  this 
development on funded pensions (OECD, 2008a, 2009: 25f; Antolin and Stewart, 2009; Pino 
and  Yermo,  2010),  but  what  is  still  missing  is  a  theoretical  underpinning  in  the  form  of 
analytical  explanations.  Some  authors  refer  to  the  form  and  scope  of  the  overall  public-
private pension mix and the institutional embeddedness in order to explain the impact of 
pension  fund  capitalism  on  financial  markets  (Jackson  and  Vitols,  2001).  We  are  more 
interested in the reverse effect: the impact of financial markets and their crises on pension 
funds. Therefore, we question to which degree the scope of pension fund capitalism and the 
impact of financial crises on pension funds are related to different institutional arrangements. 
Following  the  VoC  approach,  non-market  based  coordination  is  inherent  to  Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs) whereas Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) pursue coordination 
via  market  mechanisms.  We  try  to  explain  the  different  vulnerabilities  of  pension  fund 
capitalisms to financial crises by applying the central ideas of the VoC approach. 
                                                       
1 The author would like to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Pension Research Network (FNA) 
for their support. This paper was partly written in summer 2011 during a research stay at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies (IHS) Vienna. I am grateful for valuable comments received from the anonymous reviewer. 8 — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — I H S 
 
Related  to  interdependencies  between  production  regimes,  social  policies  and  welfare 
states,  the  following  hypotheses  will  be  tested:  countries,  in  which  market-based 
coordination mechanisms and short term strategies on financial markets are predominant, 
are  more  likely  to  have  a  higher  scope  of  pension  fund  capitalism  and  vulnerability  to 
financial market crises. Since these features characterize liberal market economies, one can 
assume a higher impact of financial crises on pension funds in such countries. 
The  next  section  provides  an  overview  of  recent  analyses  concerning  the  impact  of  the 
financial crisis on social policies. We then introduce the core arguments and hypotheses 
drawing  on the framework of the  VoC approach. Afterwards, the scope  and coordination 
mechanisms of pension fund capitalisms will be analyzed separated into the categories of 
liberal market economies, coordinated market economies, and mixed/Mediterranean market 
economies. The fourth section takes a closer look at the assets and investments of pension 
funds in different market economies, including the development during the financial crisis 
2007-09. Based on the analysis of various data sets, the results show interdependencies 
between production regime, pension fund capitalism, and the vulnerability to the financial 
crisis and with it systematic differences between LMEs and CMEs/MMEs. I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 9 
II.   Financial crisis and social policy 
The  scientific  evaluation  and  research  regarding  the  recent  financial  crisis  is  still  in  its 
infancy. The majority of the studies so far have analyzed economic or employment politics 
and have looked at state  intervention (Datz,  2009;  Eichhorst et al.,  2010; Euzéby, 2010; 
Chung  and Thewissen,  2011;  Starke et al., forthcoming),  with some  observers expecting 
countries  to  react  to  external  shocks  such  as  the  financial  crisis  according  to  specific 
production regimes (Iversen, 2007). Furthermore, only a handful of analyses have explicitly 
focused on the  impact on pensions; furthermore these studies have mainly been from a 
descriptive  perspective  (OECD,  2008a,  2009:  25f;  Antolin  and  Stewart,  2009;  Pino  and 
Yermo, 2010). Exceptions are comparative studies about the impact of the financial crisis on 
pensions in Eastern Europe (Schmähl, 2011). What is missing is a theoretical underpinning. 
Few authors emphasize the bigger impact of the financial crisis in LMEs when compared 
with CMEs, with reference to theories concerning comparative capitalism, thereby neglecting 
the effect on pensions (Nölke, 2009). 
Another  strand  of  literature  has  pointed  to  the  relationship  between  market  economies, 
welfare states, and social politics while stressing the role of employers and their attitudes 
toward social benefits for the development of welfare states (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; 
Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 2003; Schröder, 2008). Findings concerning the impact of 
pension  systems  and  the  public-private  pension  mix  on  financial  markets  reveal  that  the 
financing  of  public  pensions  and  the  scope  and  regulation  of  supplementary  pensions 
together with their institutional embeddedness are responsible for the differences between 
LMEs and CMEs (Jackson and Vitols, 2001). In contrast, the article in hand focuses on the 
reverse  effect,  the  impact  of  financial  markets  on  private  pensions.  This  study  brings 
together  two  strands  of  literature  in  order  to  fill  the  research  gaps  in  the  theoretical 
underpinning of the financial crisis and the impact of financial markets on private pensions. 10 — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — I H S 
 
III.   Market economy – pension fund capitalism – financial 
crisis  
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach distinguishes between two main configurations 
of market economies – LMEs and CMEs – depending on different forms of coordination and 
cooperation  of  firms  in  five  sub-spheres  (industrial  relations,  vocational  training  and 
education,  corporate  governance,  inter-firm  relations,  employees-management  relations) 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). It is assumed that market economies differ systematically from one 
another. The more these spheres are complementary, the higher comparative advantages 
are.  CMEs,  which  are  based  more  on  non-market  mechanisms  in  order  to  overcome 
coordination problems, and LMEs, which rely on market based mechanisms, are the two 
ideal-types  along  which  other  countries  can  be  benchmarked.  Mediterranean  Market 
Economies (MMEs) share characteristics from both LMEs and CMEs, with more capacities 
for non-market coordination but also market mechanisms within industrial relations (Hall and 
Soskice,  2001:  21).  Since  the  arguments  of  the  VoC  approach  have  been  successfully 
extended to social policy and welfare states (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Estevez-Abe et 
al.,  2001)  and  even  to  aggregate  demand  management  (Soskice,  2007),  where  CMEs‘ 
monetary institutions act more conservative, we expand the VoC-concept to pensions and in 
particular  to  pension  funds.  Following  VoC,  we  use  institutional  arrangements  as  an 
explanation for financial crisis‘ vulnerability. We assume that systematic interdependencies 
exist between the form of market economy and the design of pension funds as well as the 
impact of financial crises. Even though we partly find well established pension fund systems 
in CMEs, they differ from their liberal counterparts in design and members‘ involvement. Not 
only the importance and level of pension fund investments, but also their design and degree 
of (organized) coordination matter. In CMEs the role of pension fund capitalism is growing, 
however this is based on demographic changes and increasing public debts, but in line with 
CMEs‘ need for coordination. The nature of coordination depends in turn on the institutional 
environment and its embeddedness. We hypothesize that pension funds are lower regulated 
in  countries  with  mainly  market-based  mechanisms  of  coordination,  while  investments  in 
shares are higher in countries with financial markets based on short-term strategies. Since 
this  reflects  the  picture  of  LMEs,  countries  are  more  vulnerable  to  financial  crises  (with 
losses  mainly  of  shares)  when  they  show  core  features  of  LMEs.  We  have  formed  four 
working hypotheses based on these conclusions: 
1)  Due  to  basic  public  pension  schemes  with  low  replacement  rates  and  a  higher 
importance of financial markets for the overall economy, LMEs tend more toward 
matured pension fund capitalism. In contrast, CMEs show a lower tendency toward 
pension  fund  capitalism  because  of  earnings-related  public  pensions  with  high 
replacement  rates  and  lower  importance  of  financial  markets  for  the  overall 
economy. I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 11 
2)  The regulation and coordination of pension funds as well as the involvement of their 
members‘ interests is lower in LMEs than in CMEs. 
3)  LMEs have a higher percentage of investments in equities, whereas CMEs invest 
more in bonds and loans. 
4)  LMEs are more vulnerable to financial market crises than CMEs. 
Table  1  summarizes  the  main  expectations  for  LMEs  and  CMEs  according  to  the  VoC 
approach. 
Table 1: Theoretical expectations 
 
LME  CME 
Coordination  market-based  non-market based (organised) 
Pension fund capitalism   stronger (matured)  weaker (developing) 
Employees‘/pensioners‘ interests  no/weak involvement  (stronger) involvement 
Financial market strategies   short-term (equities)  long-term (bonds) 
Impact of financial crisis  higher  lower 
 
III.1   Methods and case selection 
In  order  to  analyse  the  interdependencies  between  market  economy,  pension  fund 
capitalism, and  vulnerability  concerning financial market crises, 19 OECD countries  have 
been selected according to data availability (see Table 2). Since data are limited to pension 
funds, other private pensions such as insurances, book reserves, and PAYGO-systems have 
not  been  taken  into  consideration.  We  recognise  that  there  might  be  differences  within 
countries between individual pension funds (which can deviate from the country average); 
but in order to analyze country and regime specific patterns, the country-level is chosen as 
the sample-level. By pension funds we mean  
―(...) the pool of assets forming an independent legal entity that are bought with the 
contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension plan 
benefits.  The  plan/fund  members  have  a  legal  or  beneficial  right  or  some  other 
contractual claim against the assets of the pension fund. Pension funds take the form 
of either a special purpose entity with legal personality (such as a trust, foundation, or 
corporate entity) or a legally separated fund without legal personality managed by a 
dedicated provider (pension fund management company) or other financial institution 
on behalf of the plan/fund members.‖ (OECD, 2005: 16). 
Since the financial crisis mainly affected financial markets and especially stock markets, the 
development  of  the  value  of  shares  is  used  as  the  main  indicator  for  vulnerability. 
Unfortunately,  no  data  are  available  for  the  development  of  shares  at  the  macro-level  in 
times of economic prosperity. Therefore we should keep in mind that, in general, shares 12 — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — I H S 
 
show higher rates of return compared to bonds and loans when markets perform well. For 
these reasons we cannot compare rates of return in times of crisis to the previous period. 
Thus we operationalize ―vulnerability‖ as the development of shares‘ rates of return during 
the crisis. Even if we can expect higher returns before and after crises, the change of value 
in the current period of financial turmoil, which seems to be longer than originally expected 
(2008-present), has a huge impact e.g. for pensioners close to retirement in the absent of 
life-cycle investments and also for the long-term development as the returns on foregone 
investments will be missing. Even if pension funds will partly recover soon, the effects of the 
crisis remain present, undermining the expected long-term growth of, but also the trust in, 
funded pensions. 
Table 2: Case selection  
  Countries 
Liberal Market Economies  AU, CA, IE, NZ, UK, US 
Coordinated Market Economies  AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, FI, NL, NO, SE 
Mediterranean Market Economies  FR, IT, PT, ES 
Sources: Hall and Soskice (2001: 19-21).  
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IV.   Results 
IV.1   Scope of pension fund capitalism 
According  to  our  first  working  hypothesis  we  expect  LMEs  to  have  only  basic  pension 
schemes with low replacement rates. This holds true for most of our LMEs since they come 
with Beveridge or Beveridge-lite public pension systems that offer replacement rates below 
60% of individuals‘ former income. Canada and the US as outliers have integrated earnings-
related benefits in their Bismarck-lite public pension systems. Linked to public basic pension 
systems, occupational pension systems are more important for LMEs, mainly on a voluntary 
basis.  Nevertheless,  in Australia  superannuation  funds  have  been  obligatory  since  1992; 
while employees in the UK can opt-out of the earnings-related part of the public pension 
scheme in favor of occupational or personal pensions. Similarly, New Zealander employees 
are entitled to opt-out from the 2007 introduced mandatory KiwiSaver system (occupational 
pensions).  
The picture emerging from the analysis of the CMEs is mixed, not completely in line with our 
hypothesis. Besides countries with Bismarckian public pensions and voluntary occupational 
pensions, countries such as Switzerland, Finland and Norway offer only low replacement 
rates in their public pension schemes together  with mandatory occupational pensions. In 
addition,  we  find  quasi-mandatory  occupational  pensions  based  on  extended  collective 
agreements  in  Denmark,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden.  The  MMEs  have  very  generous 
public  pensions;  only  in  France  is  an  obligatory  occupational  pension  scheme  (PAYGO-
financed) needed in order to obtain a decent living standard for the elderly. 
In general, the need for additional supplementary pensions and pensions funds is higher in 
LMEs  than  in  CMEs  and  MMEs.  If  we  look  at  the  scope  of  pension  fund  capitalism, 
measured as investments in percentage of the GDP, the size of pension funds is highest in 
LMEs, the average being 63% compared to 45.5% for CMEs and only 6.2% for MMEs (see 
Table 3). However, deviations are very high in the group of CMEs, reflecting the dualised 
structure  of  occupational  pensions  with  partly  (quasi-)mandatory  and  partly  voluntary 
occupational  pensions.  We  observe  similar  patterns  if  we  look  at  the  contributions  and 
benefits of pension funds. If we relate the amount of contributions to pension funds with the 
benefits they have to pay, the future situation in Great Britain, the United States, Denmark, 
Finland,  and  Portugal  seems  less  sustainable  as  their  expenditures  outnumber  their 
revenues (not taking into consideration rates of return and reserves). Even if CMEs do not 
form  a  homogenous  block  in  terms  of  high  public  pensions  and  voluntary-only  forms  of 
occupational  pensions  in  line  with  our  first  hypothesis,  the  participation  rules  of  pension 
funds  are  highly  regulated  –  either  mandated  by  the  state  or  erga  omnes  extension  via 
collective agreements – in contrast to the majority of LMEs. 
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Table 3: Scope of pension fund capitalism 2010 (% GDP) 
  All funds    Pension funds 
 
Investments    Investments  2001/10 
∆  Contributions  2001/10 
∆  Benefits  2001/10 
∆ 
AU (m)   93.8    91.0  21  8.3  14  4.6  4 
CA (v)   128.3    64.7  23  2.8  88  2.5  17 
IE (v)   44.2
a    49.1  12  -  -  -  - 
NZ (v)   13.8    13.8  -6  2.3  15  1.3  -39 
UK (v)   80.5
a    86.6  12  2.7
a  66  3.2
a  10 
US (v)   119.1    72.6  2  3.8
b  20  4.3
b  4 
LME 
mean  80.0 
 
63.0  11  4.0  40  3.2  -1 
LME CV  0.55    0.45    0.62    0.42   
AT (v)   5.4    5.3  79  0.4
a  -3  0.2
a  17 
BE (v)   3.8    3.8  -32  0.4  -5  0.2  -43 
CH (m)   111.9
a    111.9
a  9  8.4
a  28  5.5
a  16 
DE (v)   5.2    5.2  51  0.5  411  0.2  42 
DK (qm)   177.8    49.7  83  0.6  -48  0.7  23 
FI (m)   91.0    82.1  66  9.7  -1  10.4  23 
NL (qm)   134.9    134.9  32  4.7  68  4.1  37 
NO  (m)   7.8    7.8  41  0.4  -12  0.2  0 
SE (qm)   56.4
a    8.4
a  3  -  -  -  - 
CME 
mean  66.0 
 
45.5  37  3.1  55  2.7  14 
CME CV  1.00    1.14    1.26    1.39   
FR (v)   8.8
a    0.8
b  -38
c  -  -  -  - 
IT (v)   5.3    4.6  103  0.6  115  0.2  26 
PT (v)   12.3    11.4  0  0.3  -84  0,7  -54 
ES (v)   9.3    7.9  37  0.5  -54  0.4  -14 
MME 
mean  8.9 
 
6.2  25  0.5  -8  0.4  -14 
MME CV  0.32    0.73    0.33    0.58   
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Occupational pensions: v=voluntary, qm=quasi-mandatory, m=mandatory; a=2009, 
b=2008 c=2003/08. All funds: pension funds, pension insurance contracts, investment 
companies and bank managed funds, others. 
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IV.2   Regulation of pension fund capitalism 
In order to update the VoC approach for multipillar-pension systems, it is important to look 
beyond the scope of pension fund capitalism to the degree of regulation and coordination. 
Who  is  involved  in  the  regulation  and  how  strict  the  rules  for  pension  funds  are  has 
implications for market economies since different ways to solve coordination problems are 
possible. The more members and beneficiaries of pension funds participate directly or via 
trade  unions  and  employers‘  associations  in  the  regulation  and  organization  of  pension 
funds, the more organized and coordinated pension fund capitalism is. In a similar vein, state 
regulations might set standards (in contrast to market standards). Thus, we hypothesized in 
CMEs  a  higher  degree  of  regulation  and  coordination  of  pension  funds  together  with  a 
stronger  involvement  of  members‘  interests  as  compared  to  LMEs. As  a  first  hint  in  this 
direction, the former section showed regulated coverage mechanisms in particular for CMEs‘ 
(quasi-)mandatory schemes. 
In  addition  to  coverage,  pension  indexation,  investment  restrictions,  and  insolvency 
protection  can  theoretically  be  state-mandated.  A  high  degree  of  regulation  means 
strategically  coordinated  pension  fund  capitalism  and  should  result  in  fewer  losses  for 
beneficiaries. Even if mainly state regulated, regulation in general functions as non-market 
coordination. For the measure of regulation we make use of a very simple index in order to 
show  the  differences  between  LMEs,  CMEs,  and  MMEs.  Drawing  on  OECD  reports,  we 
distinguish  between  pension  indexation,  investment  restrictions  and  insolvency  protection 
according to whether state regulations exist (score 1) or not (score 0). We have chosen 
these  three  indicators  because  of  their  comparative  availability  and  because  of  their 
important function  for the  avoidance of decreasing  benefits (indexations), negative return 
rates due to a high exposure to shares (investment restrictions) and losses of benefit claims 
due to employers‘/funds insolvency (insolvency protection). Indexation of pension benefits in 
the  pay-out  period  is  almost  not  visible  in  LMEs,  apart  from  Ireland  and  contracted-out 
defined benefit schemes in the UK. Contrastingly, two thirds of the CME-countries specify 
indexation mechanisms and even three out of our four MME-countries do as well (see Table 
4). The picture becomes clear if we look at investment restrictions. All LMEs as well as the 
CMEs  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands  are  following  the  prudent  person  principle  with  only 
qualitative  restrictions,  whereas  the  majority  of  CMEs  and  all  MMEs  quantitatively  limit 
investments in risky assets. Still, we observe more requirements for insolvency protection in 
LMEs than in CMEs and MMEs, most likely because in LMEs occupational pensions are 
responsible  for  a  high  share  of  old-age  income.  In  sum,  the  total  average  changes  the 
picture again: CMEs and MMEs are higher regulated than LMEs. 
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Table 4: Index of regulation 
  LMEs  CMEs  MMEs 
Pension indexation  0.33  0.66  0.75 
Investment restrictions  0.00  0.77  1.00 
Insolvency protection  0.50  0.44  0.25 
Total average  0.28  0.62  0.67 
Sources: Own calculation based on OECD (2008b). 
Notes: Average; pension indexation: 0=no rules, 1=state rules/discretionary/self regulated; 
investment restrictions: 0=prudent person rule, 1=quantitative restrictions; insolvency 
protection: 0=no insolvency protection, 1=insolvency protection. 
 
The higher regulation and non-market based coordination of pension funds in CMEs (and 
partly in MMEs) is, in addition to state regulations, reflected in a high number of collective 
agreements  in  these  countries.  In  order  to  further  develop  the  VoC  approach  and  its 
application for multipillar-pension systems, we need to analyze the coordination mechanisms 
within pension funds, e.g. the inclusion of members‘ interests via social partners in collective 
agreements and boards. In general, and related to our second hypothesis, we find more 
collective  forms  of  pension  funds  in  CMEs  and  MMEs,  where  social  partners  jointly 
coordinate and administrate occupational pensions via collective agreements and collective 
pension  schemes  as  well  as  bipartite  governing  boards  or  supervising  committees 
(Ebbinghaus  and  Wiß,  2011:  367-371).  The  collective  and  self-administered  quasi-public 
schemes in France and Finland together with negotiated sector-wide occupational pensions 
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Germany balance interests between 
sponsors, beneficiaries and investment managers more equally and are an expression of 
more  coordination  than  the  employer  led  funds  (e.g.  trusts)  in  Great  Britain,  the  United 
States, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand with limited rights and influence of members‘ 
representatives (see also Ebbinghaus and Wiß, 2011: 355-358).  
In the Netherlands, social partners jointly negotiate and administer pension funds within a 
state  provided  regulatory  framework  (Anderson,  2011).  Administrative  boards  (parity 
representation)  are  e.g.  the  key  actors  for  decision  about  indexation,  contribution  rates, 
deficits,  and  surpluses.  Swedish  occupational  pension  schemes  are  based  on  collective 
agreements as well, without an involvement of the government in design and implementation 
(Lindquist  and  Wadensjö,  2011).  Since  2001,  occupational  pensions  based  on  collective 
agreements  are  increasing  in  Germany,  in  addition  to  the  traditional  employer-provided 
occupational pensions (Wiß, 2011). In sectors such as the metal, chemical, and construction 
industry, social partners have founded collective pension schemes with parity representation 
and administrative or advisory boards, which are e.g. responsible for contracts with financial 
companies and the overall investment strategy. Even in MMEs with high public pensions, 
social  partners  have  became  more  important  for  occupational  pensions,  although  the 
development has been triggered by a top-down process. Nevertheless, the social partners 
are  responsible  for  the  Tfr  (severance  pay)  in  Italy  as  a  gate  to  occupational  pensions I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 17 
(Jessoula, 2011). The latter are based on collective agreements in the case of (the dominant) 
closed  pension  funds  and  executive  boards  with  representatives  from  employers  and 
employees appoint e.g. the fund representative.  
In  contrast,  LMEs  follow  a  shareholder  model  of  corporate  governance  and  company 
pension funds, leaving a very little impact to unions (Bridgen and Meyer, 2011). Reforms in 
Britain since 1995 have emphasized more representativeness in trust membership. Similar 
rules concerning employees‘ representation apply to Australia and New Zealand, where the 
appointment of trusts that are responsible for the management, operation, and investment of 
funds does not require member or employee trustees (OECD, 2008b: 502-511, 486-493). 
In  addition  to  the  strong  role  of  social  partners  within  the  process  of  implementation  of 
occupational pensions in CMEs, they are also important players within the political process 
of state regulations due to their expertise in this field and due to the consensual political 
systems. Contrastingly, social partners and trade unions in particular are less involved in the 
firm organized occupational pensions in LMEs, where the government is less dependent on 
them due to their lower expertise. Furthermore, due to the majoritarian political system in 
LMEs, there is no need to include social partners in the political process (in contrast to the 
representative  political  systems  in  CMEs  and  MMEs)  of  state  regulation  (that  are  lower 
anyway). 
Experiences from the current financial crisis show that committees and supervisory boards of 
pension funds with required representation of members‘ interests, such as parity of trade 
unions and employers, existent in particular in CMEs and MMEs, performed better and with 
fewer  losses  than  their  liberal  counterparts  with  pension  funds  often  ignoring  members‘ 
interests (see also Pino and Yermo, 2010: 21f). Within committees and boards, especially 
investments  committees,  pension  fund  members‘  representatives  make  investments  of 
pension funds in CMEs more sustainable and prudent in line with the interests of insured 
persons and pensioners and with a long-term perspective. However, employers and pension 
fund managers in LMEs formally not bound to interests of pension fund members are more 
attracted by return rates as high as possible and therefore follow more short-term investment 
strategies with higher profits but riskier assets which are exposed to turmoil.  
In all countries we find state regulations, but to different extents. According to our index of 
regulation, they are stronger in MMEs and CMEs than in LMEs. In addition, regulatory space 
is filled with joint agreements and rules of social partners in CMEs and MMEs, in contrast to 
LMEs, where trusts and firms have more freedom of choice. Even if state regulation in both 
CMEs/MMEs and LMEs are existent in order to guarantee certain minimum conditions – in 
line with path dependencies of public social policy – the VoC approach clearly explains the 
differences in collective regulations in order to overcome coordination problems. 18 — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — I H S  
 
IV.3   Investments of pension funds 
Before analysing the portfolio allocation, we want to show the development of pension fund 
assets. Since no data are available from the years previous to 2001, we can only interpret 
the development between 2001 and 2009. According to our third and fourth hypothesis, we 
expect more vulnerability to turmoil and higher losses for pension funds in LMEs due to a 
higher percentage of equities in the investment portfolio in line with short-term investments 
strategies. 
On average, investments and assets of pension funds are higher in LMEs than in CMEs and 
MMEs. Between 2001 and 2009, LMEs‘ pension fund assets averaged out at 56% compared 
to 38% for CMEs (18% without Switzerland and the Netherlands) and only 6% for MMEs 
(see Figure 1). The gap between LMEs and CMEs over time is quite constant, with a slight 
convergence around 2008, immediately followed again by divergence in 2009. It seems that 
the steeper growth of pension funds in CMEs widens the gap between the latter and MMEs. 
What clearly emerges is the massive drop of pension fund assets in LMEs and CMEs in 
2002 and 2008 due to financial market crises. The decline of assets in 2008 was highest in 
LMEs with -19.9% (2002: -12.6%), followed by CMEs with -10.9% (2002: -8.3), and MMEs 
with -10.6% (2002: 0%). 
Figure 1: Development of pension fund assets 2001-2009 (% GDP) 
 
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Averages. MMEs: 2001/02/09: without France. 
 
 
Where are the losses coming from? The structure of portfolio allocations allows us to draw 
conclusions about short-term or long-term financial strategies depending on whether equities 
or bonds and loans are the main financial vehicles. According to the third hypothesis, we 
assume a  higher share  of equities for LMEs (short-term strategy) and  a  higher share  of 
bonds and loans for CMEs (long-term strategy). In general, equities make higher return rates 
LMEs 
CMEs 
CMEs (without 
NL,CH) 
MMEs 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
f
u
n
d
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
(
%
 
G
D
P
)
 I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 19 
more likely as well as losses in the event of turmoil, whereas bonds and loans are less risky 
investments  with  lower  but  more  stable  rates  of  return.  The  results  of  country  specific 
pension  funds‘  investment  portfolio,  shown  in  Figure  2,  support  our  expectations.  On 
average, the share of equities in LMEs in their total investment portfolio is 45% in 2009, 
much higher than in CMEs (25%) and three times more than in MMEs (15%). Even if Finland 
and  Portugal  stand  out  of  their  groups  with  a  higher  share  of  equities,  the  coefficient  of 
variation is below 0.5 (LMEs: 0.19, CMEs: 0.4, MMEs: 0.4) and confirms a rather consistent 
picture. The same holds true for the share of bonds in total investments in 2009. Here, the 
percentage of bonds in MMEs (55%) and CMEs (52%) is as twice as high as in LMEs (27%), 
in  accordance  with  the  long-term  oriented  investment  strategies  in  Mediterranean  and 
coordinated  market  economies  and  the  short-term  oriented  strategies  in  liberal  market 
economies. The groups are very homogenous with low deviations between 0.1 and 0.3. 
Figure 2: Pension funds’ investment portfolio 2009 (in % of total investment) 
 
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Ireland and Sweden: 2008. No data for France and New Zealand. 
 
 
Since  the  investment  portfolio  in  2009  might  reflect  shifting  asset  allocations  due  to  the 
financial  crisis  of  2007/08,  we  need  to  look  at  the  long-term  development  of  these  two 
investment categories. Between 2001 and 2009 the gaps between LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs 
remained quite constant, as did the deviations within these groups (see Figure 3). In 2002 
and 2008 we see a decline in equities investments as reaction to financial market crises and 
a shift of investments to more secure investment vehicles. As a consequence of the financial 
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crises, assets in bonds are increasing. Between 2002 and 2006, the percentage of equities 
gains  in  importance  especially  in  CMEs  and  MMEs.  Although  not  changing  the  overall 
picture, taking into account the long-term investment vehicle loans additionally widens the 
gap between CMEs and LMEs.  In line with our hypotheses, LMEs are following short-term 
investment strategies over time in contrast to long-term investment strategies in CMEs and 
MMEs. Due to the higher share of equities in LMEs, we hypothesized higher losses in times 
of financial crises because of their risky nature. 
Figure 3: Development of selected investment categories (in % investment portfolio) 
Sources: Own calculations based on OECD 
Global Pensions Statistics and Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset. 
Notes: Without France and New Zealand because of missing data. Since in a few countries 
the share of mutual funds, for which a breakdown into equities and bonds is not available, is 
high, we estimated the share of equities and bonds according to the share in all mutual funds 
at country level (aggregated). 
 
What is the impact of financial crises on equities and pension funds? In order to find an 
answer, we compare the share of equities of 2007, which was also a crisis year, with the 
investment returns in 2008 (see Figure 4). In this way, we get a strong correlation of equities‘ 
share  and  investment  losses  (r=-0.88).  Pension  funds  with  substantial  investments  in 
equities are more likely to have high losses in times of financial turbulences. Besides Great 
Britain, most of the LMEs had a high share of equities and sustained heavy deficits in 2008, 
whereas CMEs and MMEs, with lower shares of equities, performed less poorly. Finland and 
the Netherlands, having more risky investments and higher losses than the average CME, 
are in between the two groups. Since mainly LMEs have high shares of equities in their 
pension  fund  portfolios,  pension  funds  in  LMEs  are  more  vulnerable  to  financial  market 
crises, confirming our third and fourth hypothesis. 
   
LMEs 
CMEs 
MMEs 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
E
q
u
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
i
n
 
%
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
)
  CMEs 
MMEs 
LMEs 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
B
o
n
d
s
 
(
i
n
 
%
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
)
 I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 21 
Figure 4: Correlation of share of equities and losses in times of crisis 
 
Sources: OECD (2009: 34), OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: No data for France and New Zealand. 
 
IV.4   Market economy – pension fund capitalism – financial crisis 
We can conclude from the former sections that LMEs have a higher share of equities in 
pension funds‘ portfolio allocation and that LMEs are more vulnerable to financial market 
crises. But is the type of market economy, the scope of pension fund capitalism, and the 
market  turmoil‘s  sensitivity  interrelated  and  if  so,  how?  To  answer  these  questions,  the 
following  part  quantitatively  examines  possible  interdependencies.  Beyond  the  more 
descriptive  results,  the  aim  of  this  section  is  a  theory  driven  empirical  underpinning  with 
―hard facts‖. We first look systematically and grouped around CMEs/MMEs and LMEs at the 
correlation between market economy and pension fund capitalism and second at the relation 
between market economy and financial crisis. For the measurement of the type of market 
economy, we draw on the coordination index of Hall and Gingerich (2004) since coordination 
is the core feature that distinguishes a LME from a CME. Variables for the coordination in 
labor relations (level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, and labor turnover) 
together  with  variables  for  coordination  in  corporate  governance  (shareholder  power, 
dispersion of control, and size of stock market) in the 1990s build the overall coordination 
index. Based on a standardized factor analysis from 0 to 1, in countries with higher values 
strategic coordination is more important than market coordination (Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 
10-17).  In  addition,  we  use  bargaining  coverage  and  the  status  of  works  councils  as 
supplementary indicators for strategic coordination. 
Market economy and pension fund capitalism 
Confirming our theoretical framework, the type of market economy is highly related to the 
scope and regulation of pension fund capitalism. The higher the coordination in a country, 
the lower its amount of pension fund assets (see Figure 5). In LMEs with a low degree of 
strategic coordination private pensions are more important and pension funds assets higher 
than in CMEs, reflecting lower benefits in their public pension schemes. In contrast, strategic 
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coordination  is  more  important  in  countries  that  belong  to  the  CME/MME-group.  High 
replacement rates in public pension schemes reduce the need for private pensions and with 
it pension funds assets. If we exclude the two special cases Switzerland and the Netherlands 
with  (quasi-)mandatory  occupational  pensions,  the  correlation  between  coordination  and 
pension fund capitalism is even stronger. The more descriptive results regarding the relation 
between market economy and share  of equities from section IV.3 are also confirmed by 
Figure  5.  Production  regimes  based  on  market  coordination  highly  correspond  with 
substantial shares of equities in pension funds‘ investment portfolios. If we use the average 
collective  bargaining  coverage  or  status  and  existence  of  works  councils  (2001-2009), 
instead of the coordination index, as indicators for strategic coordination and the involvement 
of employees‘ and pensioners‘ interests, we find similar patterns. As a result, countries which 
follow  strategic  coordination  mechanisms  make  fewer  investments  in  equities  but  rather 
invest in secure financial vehicles such as bonds and loans. In sum, market coordination 
(LMEs)  goes  hand  in  hand  with  developed  pension  fund  capitalism,  less  involvement  of 
pension  fund  members‘  interests,  short-term  financial  strategies  and  a  higher  share  of 
equities. 
Figure 5: Relations between market economy and pension fund capitalism 
Sources: Coordination index: Hall and Gingerich (2004); pension fund assets 2001-2009 
(average): own calculations based on OECD Global Pension Statistics; share of equities 
2001-2009 (average): own calculations based on OECD Global Pension Statistics and 
Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset. 
Notes: No data for share of equities for France and New Zealand. 
 
Market economy and financial crisis 
In general, short-term market strategies with investments mainly in riskier assets such as 
equities make higher rates of return more likely. However, these investment categories imply 
the  risk  of  higher  losses  in  times  of  financial  market  turbulences.  As  we  were  able  to 
illustrate, LMEs have a higher equity exposure than LMEs. Additionally, Figure 4 points to the 
fact that pension funds‘ investment in LMEs suffered more during the financial crisis than in 
CMEs.  If  we  take  the  coordination  index  as  an  indicator  of  the  degree  of  strategic 
coordination in order to separate  a LME from a CME, Figure  6  underpins the message. 
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Pension  funds  performed  better  during  the  financial  crisis  2008  in  countries  that  follow 
mechanisms of strategic coordination, even if their return rates are negative as well. We see 
a strong positive relationship between the real investment return in 2008 and the degree of 
strategic coordination. Due to the very high equity exposure, pension funds in Ireland lost 
most money in 2008. If we use the average collective bargaining coverage between 2001 
and  2009,  the  picture  slightly  changes  but  still  shows  a  medium-strong  correlation  (see 
Figure  6).  Countries  with  a  higher  collective  bargaining  coverage,  which  is  important  for 
occupational  pensions  and  pension  funds  based  on  collective  agreements,  had  smaller 
deficits.  Our  third  indicator,  the  status  of  works  councils  (whether  they  are  existent  with 
rights,  voluntary  or  not  existent)  shows  an  even  higher  positive  correlation  (r=0.7). As  a 
result, short-term market strategies, a high equity exposure and negative investment returns 
are  interrelated.  Pension  funds  in  LMEs  are  faced  with  a  higher  vulnerability  to  financial 
market crises than CMEs, verifying our fourth hypothesis. 
Figure 6: Relations between market economy and investment returns 2008 
 
Sources: Coordination index: Hall and Gingerich (2004); Investment returns: OECD (2009: 
34). Collective bargaining coverage 2001-09 (average): ICTWSS dataset. 
Notes: No data for France and New Zealand. 
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V.  Patterns  of  interdependencies  between  different 
spheres 
How do pension fund capitalism and its vulnerability to financial market crises fit into the 
overall institutional framework of market economies? On the one hand, the focus of analysis 
is on systematic differences between LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs in sub-spheres shown by 
averages,  and  on  the  other  hand  on  the  coherence  of  these  groups  shown  by  standard 
deviations (SD). Table 5 gives an overview of the patterns of market economies in inter-firm 
relations, industrial relations, pension fund capitalism and financial crises. According to the 
availability of data, the most recent time periods are listed. Calculations are based on the 
sum of countries‘ means. The averages (in bold)  as  well as the standard  deviations are 
normalized to the range of 0 to 1 in order to make different scales comparable. We prefer 
normalized standard deviation to coefficient of variations because of the sensitivity of the 
latter to small changes and numbers close to zero. The lower the scale, the lower is the 
variation. The aim is not to present another indicator for market economy or coordination but 
rather to give evidence to similarities and differences across countries and within the country 
groups. 
The data confirm our theoretical expectations and first empirical results. CMEs and MMEs 
are  characterized  by  strategic  inter-firm  relations,  which  go  hand  in  hand  with  distinct 
systems of industrial relations, measured by bargaining level and coverage, union density as 
well as status and rights of works councils. In contrast, firms in LMEs are less interrelated 
with  each  other,  even  if  we  see  a  slight  increase  between  the  1980s  and  1990s,  and 
continuous and legal relations between social partners are rare. The low scores for standard 
deviations back the classification of countries in LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs. Organized trade 
unions  entail  organized  employers‘  associations  and  vice  versa,  resulting  in  a  privileged 
position  of  representing  members‘  interests.  This  automatically  gives  authority  to  social 
partners to build and administer welfare arrangements such as pension funds (in addition to 
e.g. social insurances). At the same time, financial markets are of varying significance in the 
overall market economy of LMEs and CMEs/MMEs that are mirrored in the importance of 
financial  markets  for  old-age  security.  In  LMEs,  market-based  financial  systems  have 
developed  with  external  corporate  financing  via  equities  and  a  high  stock  market 
capitalization. However, in CMEs bank-based financial systems have developed with long-
term investments and strategic inter-firm relationships with a low stock market capitalization. 
The results of pension fund capitalism and financial crisis tie in with the results of the other 
sub-spheres, even if the gap between LMEs and CMEs is smaller. If we take into account the 
coefficient  of  variations  instead  of  the  standard  deviation  for  private  pensions  as  a 
percentage  of  public  pensions,  we  find  more  variance  within  the  group  of  CMEs.  In  this 
group,  especially  the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland  have  substantial  expenses  for  private 
pensions because of their matured multipillar-pension systems. I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 25 
Table 5: Patterns of market economies 
  LMEs  CMEs  MMEs 
Market Economy and inter-firm relations 
  1990-95  SD  1990-95  SD  1990-95  SD 
Coordination index (1)  0.18  0.1  0.75  0.2  0.71  0.1 
             
 
1985- 
89  SD  1990- 
94  SD  1985- 
89  SD  1990-
94  SD  1985-
89  SD  1990-
94  SD 
Firm alliances (2)  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.8  0.4  0.8  0.4 
Relations purchaser-
supplier (3)  0.1  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.8  0.4 
Relations  firms-investors 
(4)  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.9  0.3  0.9  0.3  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
Employment security (5)  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.4 
Average (2)-(5)   0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.3 
             
Industrial and employee-management relations 
 
1990- 
99  SD  2000- 
09  SD  1990- 
99  SD  2000-
09  SD  1990-
99  SD  2000-
09  SD 
Bargaining level (6)  1.8  0.3  1.6  0.2  3.2  0.2  2.9  0.1  2.8  0.1  2.7  0.1 
Bargaining coverage (7)  43.2  0.2  32.3  0.1  81.3  0.2  81.1  0.2  85.0  0.1  78.5  0.2 
Union Density (8)  33.2  0.1  25.2  0.1  52.2  0.2  46.7  0.2  22.1  0.1  19.6  0.1 
Works council status (9)  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  1.9  0.2  1.9  0.2  1.8  0.3  1.8  0.3 
Works council rights (10)  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  2.2  0.2  2.2  0.2  1.0  0.3  1.0  0.3 
Average (6)-(10)  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.6  0.3 
 
      Pension fund capitalism and financial market crisis 
  1995  SD  2005  SD  1995  SD  2005  SD  1995  SD  2005  SD 
Private in % public 
pensions (11)  59  0.2  64  0.3  21  0.2  28  0.3  1  0.0  2  0.0 
  2001-09  SD  2001-09  SD  2001-09  SD 
Pension fund assets (12)  56.1  0.1  38.4  0.0  6.3  0.0 
Share of equities (13)  51.3  0.0  31.3  0.1  17.3  0.0 
Investment  return  2008 
(14)  -25.8  0.1  -15.2  0.0  -11.6  0.0 
1-Average (11)-(14)  0.5  0.2  0.7  0.1  0.9  0.1 
Sources: (1) Hall and Gingerich (2004). 
(2) Huber et al. (2004): Alliances among competing firms for research/development training, 
standard setting, 0=infrequent use, to 1=extensive use of alliances.  
(3) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term relationships between purchaser and supplier firm, 
0=infrequent use, to 1=extensive use of partnerships.  
(4) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term relationships between firms and their investors, 
0=decentralized ownership with high turnovers, to 1=large investors hold significant shares 
for long periods. 
(5) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term employment security guaranteed by firms, 0=uncommon, 
to 1=common.  
(6) Visser (2011): 1=local or company bargaining, to 5=national or central level. 
(7) Visser (2011): Employees covered by bargaining agreements in % of all employees. 
(8) Visser (2011): Net union membership in % of all employees. 
(9) Visser (2011): Status of works councils, 0= no works councils, to 2=existence and rights 
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(10) Visser (2011): Rights of works councils, 0=no rights, bis 3=economic and social rights 
including co-determination. 
(11) OECD SOCX data: Expenditure for private pensions in % of public pensions; without NZ 
and IT. 
(12) OECD Global Pension Statistics: Pension fund assets in % of GDP. MMEs: 2001/02/09: 
without France. 
(13) OECD Global Pension Statistics and Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset: share of 
equities in % of total investments. 
(14) OECD (2009: 34): Real investment return of pension funds in 2008. Without New 
Zealand and France. 
Notes:  Averages  are  calculated  on  standardized  values  (0-1).  SD=standardized  standard 
deviation (0-1) 
 
 
 
This  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  no  data  for  the  nature  of  pension  funds  such  as  the 
participation  of  unions  and  work  councils  are  included.  Nevertheless,  illustrated  earlier, 
pension fund capitalism in LMEs differs systematically from pension fund capitalism in CMEs 
and MMEs. Pension fund assets and the share of equities are stable over time, not reflecting 
the differences within the country-groups (because of the shown deviation over time). As a 
result,  pension  fund  capitalism  and  its  vulnerability  seem  to  fit  into  the  institutional 
environment for each country group (LME, CME, and MME), even if differences between 
countries in the CME group are higher compared to the other sub-spheres. 
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VI.  Conclusions 
The  main  aim  of  the  article  was  to  show  that  there  are  differences  in  pension  funds‘ 
vulnerabilities to financial  market crises, and that these differences are closely related to 
different market economies. Pension funds in LMEs suffered higher losses during the recent 
financial crisis than pension funds in CMEs and MMEs because of their market-based and 
short-term strategies with high shares of equities in the investment portfolio. Beyond these 
results,  we  recognize  the  possibilities  of  higher  rates  of  returns  in  LMEs  with  matured 
pension fund systems in times of economic prosperity. 
In line with the variety in the overall public-private pension mix, the scope of pension fund 
capitalism is higher in LMEs, but we also find a few matured occupational pension systems 
in CMEs, especially in the Netherlands and Switzerland. The variance seems to persist over 
time.  Even if  in most of the countries  belonging to  CMEs and  MMEs pension funds  are 
growing in importance, they are still far from the grown systems in LMEs. Additionally, we 
would get similar results if we include pension insurance contracts, which play an important 
role  for  occupational  pensions  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden.  Similar  to 
pension  funds  in  CMEs  and  MMEs,  pension  insurance  contracts  feature  more  long-term 
investment  strategies,  usually  with  (low)  guaranteed  return  rates  and  more  conservative 
assets. In contrast to the scope, qualitative differences between the country groups are more 
evident.  Since  pension  funds  in  CMEs  and  MMEs  are  based  on  long-term  relations  and 
strategies, as in other sub-spheres of their market economy, pension funds members are 
involved into the development and administration of funds via works councils and/or trade 
unions. Thus a long-term investment strategy with assets mainly in bonds and loans exists, 
which performed better during the crisis due to their more conservative nature with lower but 
continuous return rates. The higher vulnerability of liberal pension fund capitalism can be 
traced  back  to  lower  regulation  and  coordination  (less  consideration  of  the  interests  of 
pensioners and insured persons) resulting in short-term investment strategies with assets 
mainly in equities in line with our theoretical expectations deducted from the VoC approach. 
This does not mean that complementarities that performed poorly during the financial crisis 
do not provide benefits in other (better) times. Despite deviations also within the country 
groups, characteristics of pension fund capitalism fit quite well into the overall institutional 
setting of market economies. The systematic variety across production regimes is supported 
by the coherence within each group in terms of the sub-spheres inter-firm relations, industrial 
relations, and pension fund capitalism including financial crisis. 
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Limitations to this work are due to partly incomplete OECD data that are nevertheless the 
only information which allow cross-country comparisons of pension fund systems and their 
performance. In order to further validate the results, country specific case studies could be 
explored  as  a  next  step.  This  would  allow  deeper  analyses  regarding  single  country 
regulations and pension funds. 
From a theoretical point of view, we presented a finer tuned version of the VoC approach, 
which allows an application to multipillar-pension systems. So far, this perspective has been 
almost completely ignored as a result of considering pension fund capitalism automatically 
equivalent  to  LMEs.  But,  as  we  were  able  to  show,  there  is  a  systematic  relationship 
between varieties of market economy and varieties of pension fund capitalism if we highlight 
coordination as the core feature that distinguishes a LME from a CME. Not only the public-
private pension mix and scope of pension fund capitalism alone distinguish a LME from a 
CME  and  MME,  but  also  the  design  of  pension  funds  and  supplementary  pensions  in 
general. The development and new forms of pension funds, especially in CMEs and MMEs, 
mirror  their  specific  needs  and  traditions  of  coordination.  In  contrast  to  their  liberal 
counterparts, pension funds in CMEs are higher regulated and members‘ interests are more 
involved. Finally, the findings are also of practical value. The introduction and development of 
funded supplementary pensions is a consequence of the belief in gain resulting from the 
higher  profits  of  financial  markets  compared  to  lower  returns  in  public  pension  systems 
based on tax- or pay-as-you-go-financing. The inherent possible risks of funded pensions 
such as the massive losses in 2002 and 2008/09 have not been taken into consideration. In 
addition, following a recovery in 2010, stock markets (and state bonds of countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) are again in trouble in 2011. Since the financial 
crisis  is  currently  turning  into  a  crisis  of  the  real  economy  and  public  budgets,  we  can 
possibly  expect  a  higher  vulnerability  of  pension  funds  in  CMEs/MMEs  in  the  event  of 
increasing inflation rates and haircuts due to their high investments in bonds. From a social 
policy  point  of  view  it  is  important  to  know  how  to  avoid  future  risks  for  pension  fund 
members and sponsors. Based on the experiences  of the current financial market crisis, 
stricter regulations and more inclusive participation of pension fund members could be the 
proper mechanisms in order to downsize losses during the next financial market crisis. 
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